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Abstract²Robotics has been considered as one of the five
key technology areas for defense against attacks with weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). However, due to the mass impact
nature of WMD, failures of counter-WMD (C-WMD) missions
FDQ KDYH FDWDVWURSKLF FRQVHTXHQFHV 7R HQVXUH URERWV¶ VXFFHVV
in carrying out C-WMD missions, we have developed a novel
verification framework in providing performance guarantees
for behavior-based and probabilistic robot algorithms in
complex real-world environments. This paper describes the
system architecture and discusses how the verification
framework can be used to provide pre-mission performance
guarantees for robots in executing C-WMD missions.
Keywords²performance guarantee; verification; counter
weapons of mass destruction; critical missions; mobile robot;
formal methods

I.

INTRODUCTION

After the attack of the World Trade Center on September
11, 2001, Al-Qaeda spokesman Abu Gheith wrote that they
KDYH ³WKH ULJKW WR NLOO PLOOLRQ $PHULFDQV´ [1]. The recent
bombing at the 2013 Boston marathon in the United States
painfully reminded us that the safety and security of our
society is under constant threats from terrorist attacks. This
event reiterated the belief held by the United States military
that terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) is not a TXHVWLRQ RI ³LI´ EXW ³ZKHQ´ [2]. However,
the resilience of human nature has fueled a history of
innovation that turned tragic events into technological and
scientific developments to prevent future tragic events and
mitigate their effects [3].
The robotics community has been active in efforts in
developing technology for use in countering terrorist threats
and responding to natural disasters. The Kobe earthquake
and Oklahoma City bombing motivated the development of
robots for humanitarian efforts in search and rescue of
trapped victims and propelled the emergence of urban search
and rescue (USAR) as an important area of research for
robotics [3, 4]. These efforts led to the first use of robots for
search and rescue at the World Trade Center disaster in 2001
[5]. And most recently, robots were used for the Fukushima
nuclear plant disaster in Japan, where the high radiation
posed a substantial risk for humans to enter [6].
WMD include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) [7]. These weapons are
aimed to inflict mass casualties on a society. Thus the
development of countermeasures to these weapons is
imperative for safeguarding the security and safety of
societies under the threat of terrorism. Typical C-WMD
This research is supported by the United States Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), Basic Research Award #HDTRA1-11-1-0038.

missions include searching, identifying, and neutralizing
lethal chemical/biological agents. The time critical nature of
these missions may not permit a second attempt of the
mission. More importantly, with the potential mass impact of
WMDs, failures to counter them effectively could have dire
consequences. A C-:0' PLVVLRQ¶V VXFFHVV has to be
ensured before execution.
As part of the United States Defense Threat Reduction
$JHQF\¶V DTRA) HIIRUW WR VDIHJXDUG ³America and its allies
from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and provide
capabilities to reduce, eliminate and counter the threat and
effects from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high yield explosives´ RXU UHVHDUFK DGGUHVVHV WKH
challenging problem of providing performance guarantee or
assurance for robots in accomplishing C-WMD missions in a
real world environment. We have developed a verificationbased framework to provide such guarantees for C-WMD
robot missions, where a failure can have catastrophic
consequences [8, 9]. The core of the framework is a
verification module that conducts performance analysis of
robot missions.
The verification method is based on Process Algebra
[10], a mathematical tool for reasoning on process
representations of robot missions. The advantage of Process
Algebra is its ability to express complex robot missions and
to deal with the state combinatorial explosion incurred by the
URERW¶V LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK WKH HQYLURQPHQW [8]. The output of
the verifier includes information beyond a simple µ\HV QR¶
for the operator, in order to permit improvement of mission
performance by modifying the control program or use of a
different robot or sensors. This effectively forms a feedback
loop that supports iterative improvement in the predicted
mission performance.
This paper describes the verification framework and
presents a C-WMD mission to illustrate how the framework
can be used to verify robot mission success and its ability in
dealing with complex robot missions in realistic
environments. Robotic experiments of the mission are also
conducted to validate the performance guarantee provided by
the verification framework.
II.

RELATED WORK

WMD is an extensive category, including chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
(CBRNE) [7]. Of the WMD, biological weapons have been
considered the most likely weapons of choice for terrorists
[11]. Many characteristics of biological weapons make them

attractive for use in terrorist attacks. Bio-weapons are
colorless and odorless, which make them hard to detect. Bioweapons are also easy to access. In 1996, an Ohio man with
connections to an extremist group was able to obtain bubonic
plague cultures through the postal service [12]. Recipes for
making biological weapons are even available online [12].
Bio-weapons are also characterized by easy delivery, low
production cost, lethal in low dose, easy transportation, and
potentially contagious (e.g., smallpox) [13].
Robotics has been considered as one of the five key
technology areas for defense against attacks with weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) [14]. Humphrey [15] had identified
eight C-WMD tasks for robots, which include survey,
identification, scene observation/object tracking, medical
initial assessment,
medical
victim transportation,
decontamination, hazard disposal, and resource hauling.
However, to successfully deploy robots to accomplish these
tasks autonomously or semi-autonomously in a real-world
environment still remains a great challenge for robotics. As
tasks increase in complexity, so do the robotic systems that
are designed to do these tasks. When coupled with the
environment, increased complexity in both the task and
robotic systems increase the number of ways the systems can
fail [16].
The time-critical and mass impact nature of C-WMD
missions does not tolerate failures. Poor judgments of the
URERW¶V DELOLWLHV WR RSHUDWH LQ WKH real world have caused the
failures of many robotic systems [16]. Thus, it is the goal of
our research to develop tools that can be used to generate
performance guarantees of robotic systems for these tasks
and to aid the mission commander/robot operator in decision
making regarding the usage of robots. This paper presents
our software framework, based on formal methods, in
providing performance guarantees for behavior-based and
probabilistic robot algorithms in complex real-world
environments.
Formal methods for robots have recently emerged as an
important area of research in robotics. This is driven by the
increasing need to guarantee the safety and correct behavior
of robotic systems (e.g., surgical robots). Formal methods are
mathematical tools for verification and synthesis of software
and hardware systems [17]. Major progress has been made in
tools for verification of software and hardware systems.
However, robotics presents new challenges for formal
methods due to the fact that robots have to continuously
interact with the environment, which can be unstructured,
uncertain, and dynamic.
Formal verification methods for robotics can be generally
classified into two major categories: synthesis and
verification. Synthesis deals with the problem of
automatically generating correct-by-construction controller
for a robot or team of robots, given a model for the robot and
its specification expressed in a formal language, such that the
robot is guaranteed to satisfy the given specification [17, 18].
Most synthesis approaches use Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) as the formal specification language [16, 19-23].
However, it is not clear that LTL is the right specification
language [24]. Other specification languages such as

Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [25] and Interval Temporal
Logic (ITL) [26] can be viable alternatives to LTL.
Verification addresses the problem of proving the
correctness of a control system with respect to a formal
specification or property using formal methods [16, 27].
Model checking has been a widely used technique for this
purpose [16, 27-30]. In model checking, the system is
represented as a finite state automaton (FSA) and formal
specifications are verified by exhaustive exploration of the
V\VWHP¶V UHDFKDEOH VWDWHV [16, 28]. However, these methods
suffer from the well-known combinatorial explosion
problem. Model checking has been extended to deal with
stochastic systems using statistical sampling methods [3133]. Statistical methods reduce the cost of probabilistic
model checking by replacing numerical computation of
probabilities with sampling and require minimum memory
by avoiding model construction. However, with sampling,
there is no guarantee that the verification procedure always
produces the correct answer [32].
Our ongoing research in formal verification of robotic
systems focuses on verifying performance guarantees for a
robot or a team of robots in carrying out C-WMD missions
in real environments. The fundamental problem for verifying
robot behavior is the interaction between the robot and the
environment, which might cause unpredictable behaviors to
emerge. Thus, to verify performance guarantees about the
robot behavior, we have to model the interactions between
the environment and the robot to the extent to which it is
known. We have developed a verification framework,
VIPARS (Verification In Process Algebra Robot Schemas),
to represent robots, sensors, the control programs, and the
operating environments [8, 9]. Process algebra enables
verification of the system behavior (i.e., composition of
processes) through automated algebraic reasoning as
described in the following section.
III.

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Inserting robots into the C-WMD team not only changes
the nature of the countermeasure mission, but also the team
dynamics and its decision making (e.g., task allocation). One
critical decision that the mission commander needs to make
is whether robots should be used for a particular C-WMD
mission, where the failure of the mission can be catastrophic.
Such a decision hinges upon the predicted performance of
the robot in carrying out the mission. It is the objective of our
research to assist the mission commander in making this
decision by providing information regarding performance
guarantees using robots in accomplishing C-WMD missions
in the real world. This section describes the framework for
providing such a guarantee.
A. Overview of the Framework
The verification-based system for providing performance
guarantee is built upon MissionLab, a behavior-based robot
programming environment [34] (Fig. 1). The front-end of the
MissionLab programming environment is a usability-tested
graphical robot behavior programming interface, where the
robot program is created as a finite state automaton (FSA).
MissionLab provides a library of primitive behaviors (e.g.,

obstacle avoidance, go to goal, etc) that can be assembled
into higher-level complex behaviors (e.g., a biohazard search
behavior) in the form of FSAs. The newly added verification
system is intended to provide the robot operator with the
additional capability of verifying the performance of the
robot program she constructed for the mission at hand prior
to deployment.
Robot
Operator

Performance
Criteria

Models
(Robot, Sensors,
Environment)

MissionLab
Programming
Environment
PARS

VIPARS

Robot(s)
Fig. 1. System Architecture

The core of the proposed system in Fig. 1 is the process
algebra-based verification module named VIPARS
(Verification in Process Algebra Robot Schemas) [8]. To
obtain the performance guarantee for a mission, the robot
program is translated to PARS (Process Algebra Robot
Schemas), the specification language of VIPARS. The robot
operator also needs to provide VIPARS with models of the
robot, the sensors it is equipped with, and the operating
environment of the mission, typically from a pre-existing
library. Lastly, the performance criteria that the mission is
required to meet need to be specified as well. VIPARS then
provides the operator with the performance guarantee for the
mission based on how well the provided performance criteria
are satisfied by the given control algorithm, robot, and the
operating environment.
Based on the output of VIPARS, the robot operator can
decide whether to abort the mission due to low confidence on
success or to modify elements of the mission to improve
performance (e.g., use a different robot or modify the control
algorithm). The performance guarantee of a PLVVLRQ¶V
success is quantified as a probability distribution that
describes the likelihood of a robot successfully carrying out
the mission by satisfying all specified performance criteria
[35], which can be thresholded WR SURYLGH D ELQDU\ µ\HV QR¶
answer to the operator if desired. Additionally, the
verification module provides the human operator with other
information that is useful for iterative improvement of the
mission performance (e.g., unsatisfied constraints,
probabilities of meeting each criterion).

The verification module effectively forms a feedback
loop that the human operator can iteratively improve the
predicted performance of a robot in executing a mission. By
providing pre-mission performance analysis of robots in
carrying out C-WMD missions, the verification system under
development can assist a human robot operator in making
critical decisions regarding the deployment of robots. With
the knowledge of what would work and what would fail, the
mission commander/robot operator could save valuable time
and avoid catastrophic consequences by avoiding mission
attempts that can lead to failure.
B. VIPARS
Previously, as a technique for general-purpose software
verification, model checking has had very good results [36].
A program is converted to a state transition system in which
each state is labeled by a set of propositions on program
variable values. For robot program verification, however, we
must not only analyze the robot program but also the
variables associated with the model of the physical
environment. The combination of environmental model and
program (both of which have concurrency, uncertainty and
continuous-valued variables) renders a state-space
prohibitively large to use reachability (and thus traditional
model checking) as a practical verification paradigm.
A standard approach to deal with this state-space
explosion is to search for state regularities that can be
leveraged to reduce the size of the space: for example,
counterexample guided predicate abstraction [37] and
abstract interpretation [38]. In its interaction with the
physical environment, a behavior-based robot will regularly
respond to a fixed set of sensory percepts. This induces a
periodic regularity in the combined state-space of program
and environment. While the robot may transition to another
behavioral state with its own sets of percepts (behaviorallyrelevant sensor abstractions), thereby adding complexity to
the interaction between robot and environment, it is this
repeated handling of a specific set of percepts that is
leveraged to make the verification problem tractable. This
notion of periodic regularity will be more precise after a brief
introduction to PARS.
In PARS, a process P with initial parameter values u1, u2
« input ports/connections i1, i2 ... output ports/connections
o1, o2 ... and final result values v1, v2 ... is written as:
Pu1, u2 ... (i1, i2 ...) (o1, o2 ...) <v1, v2 ...>

(1)

If there are parts of a process description that are empty, they
are typically omitted. Processes that are defined only in
terms of a port-automaton are the atomic units, or basic
processes, from which the programs are built. Examples of
basic processes are shown in Table I.
TABLE I.
Process
Delayt
RanN<v>
Inc<y>, Outc,x
Eqa,b, Neqa,b, Gtra,b, etc

EXAMPLES OF BASIC PROCESSES
Stop
After time t
returns a random sample v
from a distribution N
perform input and output,
respectively, on port c
a=b, a!=b, a>b, etc

Abort
If forced
If forced
If forced
Otherwise

Non-basic processes are defined in terms of compositions
of other processes. For example, a process T that inputs a
value on port c1 and then outputs it on port c2 is defined:
T = Inc1<x> ; Outc2,x

(2)

, where ';' denotes sequential and conditional composition.
Other composition operations include parallel-max (|) and
parallel-min or disabling (#). The iterative construct in PARS
is recursion. A tail-recursive (TR) process is written as:
Ta = Pa<b>; Tf(a,b)

(3)

This describes a process that repeats P until it aborts. Any
language that implements sequence, condition and loop
constructs is sufficient to represent any program [39]; thus,
we are confident that PARS can represent any robot
program.
In [9], we introduced the System Period as a state
regularity to address the significant combinatorial problems
of a state-based approach. The System Period can be roughly
described as follows: given a System that is the concurrent,
communicating composition of robot controller and
environment (which is expressed in PARS as a parallel
composition of TR processes: Sys = P1 | P2 | ... | Pn), we
would like to rewrite it in TR form for the purposes of
verification. First, we define the 'period' (Pi') of a TR
process, P, as the section of the definition between the equal
sign and the tail-recursive call. This yields an expression of
the form Pi = Pi' ; Pi. If all of the periods in the component
processes of Sys (P1', P2', ..., Pn') contain port
communication and all of the input and output
communications can be matched (some periods will need to
be unrolled), then we can specify a period for the entire
System : Sys = Sys' ; Sys. The above requirement that all
input and output communication can be matched solves the
classical deadlock problem. A second constraint that we
place on the communications between component processes
is that no more than two processes are ready to communicate
on the same port at the same time; hence starvation is a nonissue as no competing processes are being denied their voice
on an input-output channel, for example. This is done to
simplify the computational complexity of the generation of
the
System
Period
without
compromising
the
representational ability - multiple inputs on a port just need
to be explicitly sequenced now. Under these constraints, the
isolation of this period turns out to be the formal
identification of the regularity in behavior-based programs.
Taking advantage of the behavioral system period, the
VIPARS verification module generates the System Period
[9] by analyzing the recurrent structure of the concurrent
composition of the robot mission controller and an
environment model. VIPARS analyzes the port connectivity
of processes within the period to determine the way in which
process variables are transformed, thereby producing a set of
recurrent functions we call flow-functions. VIPARS then,
upon specification of initial variable values and goal variable
values, attempts to solve these flow-functions with these
boundary conditions using a Dynamic Bayesian Network
approach [40].

VIPARS verifies a performance guarantee for a given
robot mission where the models of the robot, sensors, and the
environment are specified by the robot operator. For
example, consider a single-waypoint mission, where the
robot controller attempts to move the robot from point P0 to a
goal point G. Capturing the uncertainty associated with
sensor and actuator performance, the process parameter for
robot position is represented as a distribution of positions. At
each time-step through the Bayesian network, VIPARS
evaluates sensor and actuator performance probabilities and
calculates the probability that mission criteria are met. The
robot operator needs to specify Tmax and Pmin as performance
criteria; that is, the measure for success is that the robot must
be at the goal point G after some time t<T max with a
probability p>Pmin.
The output of VIPARS is two-fold: 1) a Boolean answer
to whether the mission can be successful and 2) a detailed
record of the values of variables and distributions through
successive time steps. From this output, a feedback loop is
created which gives the robot operator the ability to refine
the robot program until they are sufficiently confident to
deploy the robot.
IV.

VERIFICATION OF A C-WMD MISSION

A typical scenario that motivates the development of our
C-WMD missions is the sarin gas attack of the Japanese
subway system [12]. On March 20, 1995, members of the
Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo released sarin gas, a lethal
nerve agent, on the subway trains in Tokyo. This attack
resulted in 13 deaths and thousands of injuries. Sarin is
colorless and odorless, which made it undetected by victims
until symptoms started to appear. Some injuries were
preventable, but delays in identifying the responsible agent
allowed contamination to spread to hospitals, where staff
failed to put on protective clothing and gas masks [12]. This
event highlights the need to develop effective
countermeasures for this type of attack.
The key element of a countermeasure to a biological
attack is the rapid identification of the biological agent used
before the agent is widely disseminated [11]. Only after the
nature of the biohazard is identified, can the first responders
proceed to decontaminate the hot zone area and administer
appropriate treatment for victims. In this section, we present
a Biohazard Search mission where a robot is tasked to search
an area for biohazard, Fig. 2.

Fig. 2. Indoor Biohazard Search

The control program of the robot for the mission, as
shown in Fig. 3, is constructed in MissionLab as a behavioral

assemblage in the form of a FSA. The FSA consisted of three
behaviors (Wander, MoveToward, and Stop) and three
triggers (Detect, NotDetected, and Near). With this
behavioral assemblage, the robot starts with random
exploration of the environment. However, when Detect is
triggered, the robot switches from random exploration to
moving toward the detected biohazard. This mission is
completed once the robot is within a certain distance of the
biohazard. While we adopted a simple search strategy (i.e.,
Wander behavior) for this mission, more sophisticated search
strategies can be employed as well. VIPARS can potentially
be used by the human operator to verify which search
strategy would be most effective.

Criteria

=

Delay¢t² ; ( At¢p² | Biohazard¢p² )

(5)

The At¢p² process indicates the robot is at location p, the
Biohazard¢p² process indicates the location of the biohazard,
and the Delay¢t² process indicates a time t has passed. In
verification we ask whether the mission will achieve this
liveness condition for t<Tmax with at least probability Pmin.
The Criteria process is a property specification process
network, which differs from a process network in that it is
actually a process network constraint expression, a
specification of a set of possible networks [9].
A robot model generally includes the kinematic model of
the robot platform. More complex robot models would
include robot dynamics, battery life, tire properties, etc. The
robot to be used for this mission is a Pioneer 3-AT, Fig. 4,
and it is modeled in PARS as:
Robot

=

(Delay¢t²# Odo¢r² # At¢r²) ; Ran¢4²¢z² ;
In¢v²¢u² ; Robot¢r+(u+z)t ²

(6)

Odo

=

Ran¢)²¢e² ; Out¢p,r+e²; Odo¢r²

(7)

The process Atr represents the robot at location r. The
process Odo (short for Odometry sensor) transmits the robot
location in a loop until terminated by the Delay. In our
results, we use a multivariate normal distribution for these
distributions. The sensor noise is characterized by the
distribution 4 ~ N(Ps,Vs) and actuator noise by ) ~
N(Pm,Vm).

Fig. 3. FSA of the Biohazard Search Mission

When the robot operator is finished with the design of the
robot behavior, the control program is then translated into
PARS, the language of the VIPARS, for verification. The
PARS representation of the Biohazard Search behavior in
Fig. 3 is expressed as
Behavior

=

NotDetected ; (Detected # Wander) |
Detected ; (Near # MoveToward) | Near
; Stop

(4)

The above can be described as the concurrent composition of
the following behaviors: 1) if not detected, wander until
found, 2) if detected, move until near and 3) if near, stop.
The Behavior process models the high-level Biohazard
Search behavior. The Behavior process consists of a
hierarchically nested process network. The lower-level
processes in the network are PARS models of primitive
behaviors, which are translated offline to PARS and stored in
a library. This follows the spirit of behavior-based robotics
[41] and simplifies the representation of complex behaviors
in PARS.
Different missions have different requirements that the
robot has to meet. For the Biohazard Search mission, we are
interested in time performance, successful detection of
biohazard, and correct identification of the biohazard. These
performance criteria are expressed in PARS as a
performance specification network:

Fig. 4. Pioneer 3-AT

We chose to separate some sensor models from robot
model because the same robot platform can be equipped with
different external sensors. By separating certain sensor
models from robot models, it allows the addition/change of
sensors without modifying the robot models. For this
mission, the Pioneer 3-AT robot is equipped with a camera
for biohazard detection and a SICK laser scanner for obstacle
avoidance. The sensor model is a composite model of these
sensors, which can be expressed in PARS as:
Sensor

=

Camera | Laser

(8)

Camera

=

Out<s,sv> ; Camera

(9)

Laser

=

Out<o,svo> ; Laser

(10)

The Out<s,sv> and Out<o,svo>processes output current target
sensor information and current obstacles respectively.
The fundamental problem for the verification of robot
behavior is the interaction between the robot and the

environment, which can be uncertain, unstructured, and
dynamic. Undesirable robot behaviors might emerge through
this interaction, which might not have been foreseen by the
robot programmer/operator. Thus, it is important for a
verification language to be expressive enough to represent
complex real-world environments. The targeted environment
for the Biohazard Search mission is an indoor environment,
Fig. 2. The PARS model of the environment is expressed as:

the biohazard is assumed to be in the room and its probability
of being at any point in the room is considered to be
uniformly distributed. The environment is also assumed to be
free of obstacles. However, the experiment can be extended
to study a clustered environment where the biohazard might
be hidden behind some obstacles. Introducing obstacles into
the environment is expected to increase the search time and
decrease the probability of mission success.

(11)

With the mission represented by the System process (12),
VIPARS first generates the system period and flow functions
for the process with the SysGen and FloGen algorithms we
developed in prior work [8, 42]. A parameter flow function is
a mapping f : Sm \ Sm that relates the values of m
parameters (i.e., process variables) in the nth and (n+1)th
iterations of the system period [9] )RU H[DPSOH WKH URERW¶V
position is updated at each iteration of the recursive process
using the flow function:

Environment

=

(Out¢pi,qi² # Out¢po,qo² #In¢p²¢q²) ;
(Cond¢inside,q²¢qi² |
Cond¢outside,q²¢qo²) ;
Environment¢qi,qo²

Random variable values, such as the robot position, are
represented in PARS as Gaussian Mixtures [40].The
Environment process tests the robot position probability
distribution and separates into two mixtures: on representing
the portion of the distribution that is inside the room (qi), and
one that represents the portion that would collide with the
room walls (qo). That portion will be channeled to the
Camera and Laser sensor processes to return information
back to the control strategy.
The PARS models of the control program, robot, sensors,
and the environment form the System process, which is the
concurrent, communicating composition of component
processes
System

=

Behavior | Environment | Robot | Sensor

(12)

The System process is then analyzed by VIPARS to
determine if it satisfies all the constraints specified by the
property specification process network (i.e., the Criteria
process).
V.

RESULTS

This section presents the result of the verification system
for the Biohazard Search mission, which tasks a robot to
search a room for a potential biohazard within a certain time
limit. Experimental validation of the mission is also
conducted to show the validity of the verification result.
Validation basically consists of running the mission on a
physical robot in the real environment and measuring the
URERW¶V SHUIRUPDQFH 9DOLGDWLRQ DQG YHULILFDWLRQ UHVXOWV DUH
compared using a z-statistic proportion test to determine if
any statistical significant difference exists between these
results.
A. Verification of Biohazard Search Missions
VIPARS performed the verification of the Biohazard
Search mission to provide a performance guarantee of the
mission for the robot operator in a given environment. The
mission is verified against two performance criteria: 1) locate
the biohazard successfully and 2) complete the mission
within 60 seconds. The biohazard is successfully located by
the robot when it is within 1.0 meter of the biohazard. The
mission is completed when the biohazard is located by the
robot; however, the mission is only successful when the
biohazard is located within 60 seconds since the start of the
mission. The operating environment of the mission is
assumed to be a medium-sized room (i.e., 10m x 10m) for
verification. Another assumption made for verification is that

f(pt+1) = pt + vt

(13)

where p is the robot position, v is the robot velocity, and t is
the time step. We have shown that verification then consists
of solving these flow functions for the initial variable values
and the goal variable values as boundary conditions [42]. We
also developed a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN)
approach for solving these flow functions [42].
Our approach of evaluating the mission success consists
of two stages, in which first one is to determine the
probability that the robot will detect the target given the
camera sensitivity data. The second stage is basically simply
evaluating the probability of success of the robot moving
toward the target, within the time left in the time constraint
that has not been used up in the first stage. The camera
calibration model was given as a probability of target
detection given the target was y meters from the robot for y =
1m to 10m; we write this as 2(O|P=NCAP=P U , NK>KP=P 0 ). Only
the mean data was used and a Gaussian was fit to the data
based on minimizing the error between the Gaussian and the
calibration data in the range 1m to 10m. Target detection
probability at time t was expressed as
2:O; = Í Í 2 @OZP=NCAP=PT+U A 2kNK>KP=PT o2 @P=NCAP= PU A
T

(14)

U

where 2 @P=NCAP=P U A is the same at every point (i.e., the target

can be located anywhere in the room) and sums to 1 for the
room. The robot position distribution Pkrobot at x o is
convolved with the zero-mean camera calibration
P(s|target at y , robot at 0 ) to get P @sZtarget at x +y A Pkrobot at x o
and this is numerically integrated over the room to get the
probability of detection at this discrete time. The probability
of detection on each time step is also assumed independent.
The performance guarantee of a mission is the
quantification of the ability of the specified mission to be
completed successfully in the given environment [35].
Currently, we represent this quantity as the probability of
mission success with respect to the specified performance
criteria. The result of the verification is summarized in Table
II. The result indicates that the verifier predicted an 85%

success probability for the Biohazard Search mission with
the robot operating in the environment with respect to the
performance criteria specified earlier. This result can be
WKUHVKROGHG WR JHW D µ\HV QR¶ DQVZHU IRU WKH URERW RSHUDWRU
regarding whether the mission will be successful. This
information can then be used by the operator to make the
decision of whether to deploy the robot or not.
TABLE II.

VERIFICATION RESULT1

Mission
Biohazard Search

Performance
85.0 %

C. Comparison of Verification and Validation Resutls
Verification of Biohazard Search mission predicted an
85% mission success probability, while the validation
experiments showed an actual robot succeeds 83% of the
time based on 106 trials with 18 failures. Validation and
verification results are compared using a z-statistic
proportion test to determine if any statistical significant
difference exists between these results. The null hypothesis is
H0: psucc=0.85, and the alternative hypothesis is Ha:
Psucc<0.85. The z-statistic for the results is calculated in (15).
V=

B. Validation
Rigorous experimental validation needs to be conducted
to validate the predicted performance generated by
verification. For the Biohazard Search mission, validation
experiments were carried out to obtain the actual
performances of the robot in the real environment. For the
validation experiment, the operating environment of the
robot is a room with a dimension of approximately 10m x
12m, Fig. 2. The room is covered with tile flooring and is
well lit by florescent lights. The major area of the room is
empty except some standard items along the walls (e.g.,
cabinets, storage crates).
The robot that was used for this mission is a Pioneer 3AT, Fig. 4. The robot is equipped with a laser scanner for
obstacle avoidance and a forward-facing camera for
biohazard detection. The camera has a field of view of 39.6
degrees. The biohazard is represented by a red biohazard
bucket, Fig. 4. The bucket is 0.38m in height and 0.3m in
diameter. Color feature of the biohazard bucket is used for
biohazard detection.
The complete validation experiment consists of 106 trial
runs of the Biohazard Search mission. For each trial, the
robot starts at the entrance of the room and proceeds to
search the room with the control program described in Fig. 3.
For all the trials, the location of the biohazard is uniformly
distributed with respect to the room. Each trial is completed
when the robot locates the biohazard. Mission success is
defined by the performance criteria. For this mission, the
criterion is that the robot needs to find the biohazard in 60
seconds. Thus, the time it takes for the robot to locate the
biohazard is recorded for each trial. The result of the
validation experiment is shown in Table III.
TABLE III.
Mission
Biohazard Search

# Trials
106

VALIDATION RESULT
# Successes
88

Performance
83.0 %

1 The initial verification result was reported blindly as 79%
without the knowledge of the validation result, which resulted in z
= 1.01 and P(Z<1.01) = 0.16 > 0.05. However, it was discovered
that this initial result used a stopping radius of 0.75m rather than
1.0m. The verification was rerun with the correct condition, after
the initial comparison between verification and validation results,
which resulted in the corrected 85% value.

L1 F L0

§L0 (1 F L0 )
J

=

0.83 F 0.85

§0.85(1 F 0.85)
106

= F0.58

(15)

We obtained a z-statistic as z = -0.58, which resulted in
P(Z<-0.58)= 0.28 from the standard distribution table. Since
0.28>0.05, we fail to find any statistically significant
GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH YHULILHU¶V SHUIRUPDQFH SUHGLFWLRQ DQG
the actual performance from the validation experiments. We
DUH WKHQ VDIH WR FRQFOXGH WKDW WKH 9,3$56¶ SHUIRUPDQFH
guarantee, the 85% probability of mission success with
respect to the performance criteria, for the Biohazard Search
mission is a valid prediction.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The goal of our research is to develop a tool for
automatic verification of performance guarantees of a robot
or a team of robots for critical C-WMD missions in complex
real-world environments. To this end, we have been
developing a formal verification framework, named
VIPARS, based on process algebra, which allows algebraic
reasoning over the PARS models of the system. Given the
performance criteria for a C-WMD mission, VIPARS
verifies whether the combination of control program, robot,
sensor, and environment models will satisfy the mission
criteria. The output of VIPARS is also designed to provide
guidance to an operator to improve mission performance if
the initial predicted performance is not satisfactory. This
paper also presented a C-WMD mission that was used to
illustrate how the verification framework can be used to
provide performance guarantees of robots operating in realworld environments. Experimental validation of the
Biohazard Search mission was conducted to obtain the actual
performances of the robots. A comparison between the
verification and validation results showed the proposed
V\VWHP¶V DELOLW\ LQ SURYLGLQJ YDOLG performance guarantee for
time-critical missions.
Future work includes verification of additional C-WMD
missions such as multi-robot coordination, outdoor building
approach, and simultaneous localization and mapping
(SLAM) in unknown environments. More extensive
verification and validation of robot performance will also be
conducted at the USAR test facility at the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [43].
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